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ABSTRACT 
Austria has gone through two cycles of university reforms since 
the 1960s. The first a imed to open the universities to social and labour 
market demand and to make their structures more democrat ic and 
flexible. The second re form cycle dealt with glitches in the overly close 
relationship between universit ies and state bureaucracy. Bureaucrats still 
tightly controlled universit ies through l ine-budget fund ing and other 
fo rms of micro-management . This close dependency was abolished 
and university au tonomy greatly strengthened when traditionally weak 
university leadership was replaced by a strong president and centralized 
administrat ion, and by the creation of governing boards. The author 
argues that the second re form cycle was much influenced by Anglo Saxon 
models of university governance and consti tuted an almost total break 
with the traditional structures of Austrian universities. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
L'Aut r iche a entrepris deux grandes séquences de ré fo rmes 
universi taires depuis les années 1960. La première faisai t accepter aux 
universi tés les demandes sociale et économique du marché du travail . La 
deux ième r é f o r m e cherchait à dis tancer l 'univers i té de l 'É ta t enseignant , 
a r rangement caractérisé par une ingérence bureaucra t ique central isatr ice 
de longue date et minée par des mécan i smes d ' approba t ion détail lée 
des budgets universitaires. Cet te relation de dépendance étroite a 
été abolie et l ' au tonomie a été établie grâce au renforcement du 
leadership universi taire par la nominat ion de recteurs présidents forts 
de leurs propres fiefs administrat i fs , et par l ' é tab l i ssement de consei ls 
d 'adminis t ra t ion . L 'au teur mont re à quel point cette dernière r é fo rme 
s ' inspirai t pr incipalement de modèles anglo-saxons en mat ière de 
gouvernance universi taire, et consti tuait une rupture quasi- totale avec 
les structures t radit ionnelles des universi tés autr ichiennes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last four decades, Austria has experienced two cycles of higher 
education reform, sharply differentiated by policy, and separated by a 
decade of consolidation. The first cycle began in the 1960s and peaked 
in the mid-1970s, putting higher education under the umbrella of welfare 
state policies, emphasizing student participation, allowing junior faculty 
members to participate in decision-making, and broadening research. The 
policy catchwords were "opening" and "democratization." 
The second cycle followed international policy trends of the 1990s. It 
produced reform legislation granting full legal status to universities as public 
enterprises. The relevant buzz words are "deregulat ion" and "efficiency." 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Educa tion 
Volume XXXIV, No. 3, 2004 
Austrian Higher Education Meets the Knowledge Society 57 
OPENING AN ELITE SYSTEM 
Governments in the 1960s and 1970s had many good reasons to take 
action in higher education policy. Austrian universities were in a bad shape. 
They remained elite institutions only in size, serving about five percent 
of the potential student population. The glorious research period of the 
late 19th and early 20th century was long over. The political catastrophes 
of the 1930s and 1940s resulted in two waves of expulsion for political 
and racial reasons that deprived universities of many able researchers 
(Stadler, 1988). Only the most active Nazis were expelled in the immediate 
post-war years; émigrés were rarely welcomed back. Universit ies were 
known for intellectual narrowness rather than innovation. 
Educational re form became a political priority in the 1960s. The 
government set the course for educat ional expansion and modif ied 
the traditional chair system (Ordinarienuniversi tat) . The overarching 
goal of this first re form cycle was to "open up" rigid elite structures 
(Pechar, 1996). It was vital to remove visible and hidden barriers that 
excluded many talented students. The spectrum of recognized disciplines 
and methodological approaches broadened to include sociology and 
political science. Finally, the structures and procedures of university self-
governance changed so junior faculty and students had a limited say in 
decis ion-making. 
The first cycle was triggered by a remarkable policy shift . For the 
first t ime, education was regarded not just as a matter of culture, but as 
an investment yielding economic and other social benefits, an important 
factor in economic growth and competi t iveness. Mos t political actors 
thought student participation in advanced education had not kept pace 
with labour market demand. Educat ional opportunit ies had therefore to be 
expanded and access improved. W h e r e former ly policy makers took it for 
granted that low participation rates in the elite tracks of secondary schools 
and in universit ies proved lack of talent, it now became obvious that the 
pool of talent by far exceeded the number of students in institutions of 
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higher learning. The main policy goal became to make use of that hidden 
resource ( A u s s c h o p f u n g der Begabungsreserven). 
Policy makers took various measures to encourage student 
participation. They widened access to Gymnasium and other kinds1 of 
elite secondary education. Entrance exams to Gymnasium were loosened 
during the 1960s and abolished in 1971. This was an important signal to 
parents previously deterred by selection procedures . Within a f ew years, 
graduates f r o m the secondary elite track (Maturanten ) increased f r o m 8% 
of the age cohort (1960) to 17% (1971) and eventually to 4 0 % (2002). 
Financial barriers to students f r o m low and middle income famil ies fell . 
In 1963, a new student aid act gave legal enti t lement for grants to needy 
students who fulfi l led certain minimal criteria of academic achievement . 
In 1971, tuition fees which had steadily diminished because they were 
never adjusted to inflation were abolished altogether, redefining higher 
educat ion as a public good. 
Mos t key figures in Austr ian universities had little appeti te to take 
more students. They worried that expansion of student numbers would 
eventually undermine the privileges of elite institutions. But Austrian 
universit ies had no effect ive means of resisting demand. All graduates 
f r o m the elite track of secondary education were entitled to enrol at any 
Austrian university. Re fo rms that widened access to Gymnasium had 
inevitable consequences on first enrolment at universities. There was no 
legal way to keep students out of the ivory tower. 
Despi te professorial opposit ion, student numbers increased 
t remendously (see Table 1) This extraordinary growth was caused by 
a combinat ion of rising participation rates on the one hand, and the 
growing age cohorts of the baby boomers on the other hand. During the 
early 1970s, growth was publicly welcomed as evidence of successful 
public policy. Graduates were no longer in short supply and there was 
some discourse on "overeducat ion." The first indications of graduate 
unemployment forced reassessment of the economic benefits of higher 
educat ion, and a consequent shift in government policy. 
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Policy makers began to express concern over high drop-out rates and 
the long duration of programmes of study.2 It became increasingly evident 
that Austrian universities had not sufficiently adapted to large-scale higher 
education. Laissez-faire teaching and learning appropriate in a small and 
elite system, where students were treated as "apprentice researchers" free 
to determine their own course and pace of study, produced chaos in a 
system attempting mass higher education. 
Most academics defended liberal style of teaching and learning as 
the only appropriate pattern of adult higher education—as opposed to 
school-like teaching (Verschulung). Students who did not fit in were by 
definition unsuited and unqualified for elite education and should look for 
alternatives. But there were few alternatives and Austria did not establish 
a non-university sector (Lassnigg & Pechar, 1988). 
Traditionally, the governance pattern of the elite system embraced a 
dualism between the administrative and academic sides. As a state agency, 
the university was, of course, subject to centralised decision-making by 
legislation and state bureaucracy; but all issues regarding teaching and 
research lay in the hands of the academic oligarchy—all chair-holders in 
charge of their own specialized field of research. The university saw itself 
as a self-governing community of scholars held together by common 
values. Problems were solved by chair-holding professors and the state 
bureaucracy. The rector was expected primus inter pares to represent the 
university, not to govern it, let alone manage it. 
Academics saw no benefit in the university's achieving corporate 
autonomy. The educated elite saw it as a cultural obligation of the 
enlightened secular state (Kulturstaat) to enhance academic life. The state's 
duty was to protect the integrity and autonomy of universities and secure 
academic f reedom f rom outside pressures, supporting academics as civil 
servants with l ife tenure. The implicit precondition of dual governance 
was mutual trust and respect between academics and policy makers and 
commonly shared assumptions about the nature of universities. 
The first reform cycle seriously disturbed this tacit understanding. 
The government introduced modern policy concepts borrowed f rom other 
O E C D countries. When a majority of the academic oligarchy opposed 
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higher education reforms, the government enforced its policies through 
legislation and other means of regulation. Mutual trust and respect 
between academics and policy makers began to erode. The state was no 
longer a benevolent patron; academics no longer accepted and trusted the 
decisions of policy makers. 
One area of conflict was quality assurance in teaching. It had 
been taken for granted that curr iculum quality was the responsibili ty 
of academia: a loose legal f r amework for all aspects of teaching and 
learning al lowed professors a high level of personal discretion. The first 
ma jo r re form act established a new legal basis fo r study courses, a ma jo r 
step towards formal izat ion and harmonizat ion of curricula under federal 
law and ministerial decrees. The commentary to the new act explained 
that education at universit ies was simply too important as to be left to 
academics (Gotz, 1993). Using the new legal f ramework , policy makers 
intended to establish a reliable ex-ante control, assuring high quality while 
introducing social re levance to the curr iculum. Mos t academics regarded 
such study regulat ion as inappropriate government interference. 
The mos t heated area of confl ict concerned the role and status 
of jun io r academics , fo rmer ly subordinate to chai rholders as heads 
of academic units. Univers i t ies could only cope with r is ing s tudent 
numbers by expand ing jun io r facul ty numbers and widening their 
responsibi l i t ies . Non-professor ia l academic staff took on an increasing 
range of academic func t ions . The Univers i ty Organisa t ion Act of 1975 
( U O G 1975) granted s tudents and jun ior academics l imited vot ing 
power in col legial bodies . All a t tempts a imed to in t roduce par t ic ipatory 
dec i s ion-making structures within the universi ty natural ly met stiff 
opposi t ion f r o m the academic ol igarchy. 
A MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION? 
The 1980s were a t ime of consolidation af ter a period of severe 
changes and disappointment of high expectat ions triggered by reform. 
In general, Austr ian developments ran in parallel with other O E C D 
countries. Expectat ions based on naive interpretations of human capital 
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theory were suddenly confronted with graduate unemployment . W h e n it 
became clear the promises of human capital and its benefits were not 
likely to be fulfi l led, higher education ceased to be a top priority of public 
policy makers . As elsewhere, fiscal consolidation became the main 
concern of governments . 
Thus , the alliance between reform-oriented academics and policy 
makers gradually ended. Much that former ly worked through implicit 
agreements was now based on formal rules and legal acts. Academics 
started to complain about excessive regulat ion and bureaucrat ic overload. 
That universit ies were state agencies was suddenly seen as a burden. The 
dominant view was that because universit ies were bound by a rigid state 
bureaucracy, they could not develop creatively. The gloomy academic 
mood of the t ime is portrayed in Riiegg (1987). A survey of expert 
opinions a m o n g 17 European states came to the conclusion that Austrian 
experts in higher education had lost nearly all confidence in their system 
(McDaniel , 1992). Academics now sought to liberate universit ies f r o m 
state regulation. " A u t o n o m y " became the catchword. 
A second re form cycle was tr iggered, when polit icians and senior 
civil servants began to agree with these views of state regulation. 
Increasingly, policy makers felt overwhelmed by the complexi ty of 
the mass higher education system. They lacked the necessary means 
(sufficient information and influence to motivate actors at lower levels) 
to implement "best solutions." Visions of "one best sys tem" under central 
steering faded away. At the end of the 1980s, government abandoned its 
approach of stringent state regulation of all kinds of education institutions. 
This m o v e towards deregulat ion was facili tated by fiscal consolidat ion. 
Senior civil servants had no interest in the ugly details of execut ing cuts 
and became quite sympathet ic to arguments for enhanced au tonomy of 
higher educat ion institutions. 
An important aspect of the second re form cycle was a change in the 
national role models to which policy makers referred. Policy borrowing 
(Halpin & Troyna, 1995) plays a crucial role for the design and legit imation 
of fundamenta l re forms in small countries. Dur ing the first cycle, policy 
makers referred mainly to corresponding re fo rms and concepts in 
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Germany, due to the common cultural tradition of both countries and the 
similarity of their systems. During the second re form cycle, there was 
growing interest into the Anglo-Saxon traditions of higher education, 
both the U K (Pechar, 2002) and later the U S (Pechar, 1993). Concepts 
and policies totally alien to the Austr ian tradition, such as accreditation 
or governing boards, were borrowed f r o m the Anglo-Saxon contex t—a 
very deep change in the underlying paradigms of higher education policy. 
Governments abandoned the Kulturstaat tradition for the Anglo-Saxon 
policies of N e w Public Management . These new concepts gave rise to 
another wave of reforms. Within a f ew years, the architecture of Austrian 
higher education changed fundamental ly . 
The core re form of the second cycle was a fundamenta l re-organization 
of university governance, through the Universi ty Organisat ion Act of 
1 9 9 3 - U O G 1993 —and the Universi ty Act of 2 0 0 2 - U G 2002, which 
t ransformed institutions f r o m state agencies into public enterprises. 
In 1991, the education ministry published a draf t for organizational 
re form promising to liberate universit ies f r o m most fo rms of governmental 
control (Federal Government , 1991). Policy makers c laimed this was a 
response to academic requests for more autonomy (Pechar & Pellert, 1998). 
First, though, the government wanted to strengthen senior managerial 
positions at universities, replacing the r ec to r—who represented the 
tradition of "first among equals" — with a president. N e w links were to be 
forged be tween universit ies and external stakeholders by introducing the 
Anglo-Saxon concept of trusteeship and by establishing governing bodies 
which would represent relevant (and powerfu l ) stakeholders. 
Policy makers believed universities would at least partly support this 
new policy of deregulation. But university autonomy can be interpreted in 
totally different ways by different actors. Academics still saw the notion of 
autonomy within the conceptual f r amework of the Kulturstaat tradition, 
while the government had already adopted the language of N e w Public 
Management . In the Humboldt ian tradition, au tonomy is used chiefly as a 
synonym for academic f r eedom of the individual, i.e., the ful l professor. 
Many professors saw autonomy as a buzz word for restoration of the 
"old reg ime" of academic oligarchy, of the Ordinarienuniversitat. Junior 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXIV, No. 3, 2004 
64 Hans Pechar 
faculty and students mainly favoured the concept of the autonomous 
"group university" and its collegial bodies in which—after the 
democratic reforms of the 1970s—they had some representation. Those 
collegial bodies should govern the university without any interference 
f rom the state, whose sufficient and unconditional funding was simply 
taken for granted. Politicians and state bureaucrats advocated autonomy 
because they wanted to turn universities into enterprises which would be 
responsible not only for academic, but also for financial and administrative 
affairs. This interpretation of autonomy would go hand-in-hand with 
the development of a professional management and a strengthening of 
external scrutiny by supervisory boards (Hollinger, 1992). 
A majority of academics strongly opposed the very idea of institutional 
autonomy, seen as an excuse for government abandonment of financial 
responsibility. The government softened its initial approach: senior 
leadership positions were strengthened, but their power was balanced 
by the significant influence of the collegial bodies. The influence of 
external stakeholders was reduced, and governing boards were replaced 
by advisory bodies. The ministry refused to give lump sum budgets to 
universities, arguing universities lacked sufficient managerial structures. 
The University Organisation Act of 1993 (UOG 1993), a compromise 
between proponents and opponents of the reform, amounted to a cautious 
step towards autonomy. It was easy to see this was an intermediary stage. 
Probably the most important consequence of the U O G 1993 was the 
appearance of newly powerful rectors and deans. This small but influential 
group of senior academics were sensitive to external needs and pressures 
and could no longer be regarded as a group representing only the internal 
interests of academe, but increasingly as a mediating power. 
It was the new rectors who complained that the U O G 1993 was 
only a half-measure. The government 's first draft for the U O G 1993 had 
offered full legal-civil status to universities, and lump sum budgets to 
f ree universities f rom the state accountancy (Kameralistik) , and it was 
this first version that the new academic managers favoured. Thus, the 
government gained a powerful ally in the university, some of whom were 
active in draft ing the next reform law (Titscher et al., 2000). The majority 
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of academics, however, continued to oppose the idea of ful l legal and 
civil status. 
In the late 1990s, tensions be tween governments and academics 
intensif ied under cont inual fiscal cuts and renewed manager ia l i sm. In 2000, 
a conservat ive government firmly changed the style of pol icy making . In 
the face of g rowing hostility, earl ier socia l -democrat ic governments had 
retained the consensual polit ics of pos t -war years. The new conservat ive 
government proudly announced a "speed ki l ls" approach forc ing big 
changes within a f ew years. In 2001, a new organizat ional act was draf ted 
and in 2002, af ter a f e w minor compromises , the University Act 2002 
(UG 2002) was passed by Par l iament (Sebök, 2002). Implementa t ion 
began in 2004. 
Universit ies ceased to be state agencies and became ful l legal entities, 
but were not privatized. They remain "legal persons under public l aw" 
(Körperschaften öffentlichen Rechts). The federal government retains 
responsibili ty for basic funding , but universit ies are exempt f r o m the 
fiscal regulat ions of the federal budget (Kameral is i tk ) and instead receive 
a lump sum budgets at their own discretion. 
Resources are allocated on the basis of per formance contracts. 
Twenty per cent of the budget allocation will be based on indicators. The 
internal organization of universities — other than the general regulat ions 
regarding the decis ion-making structure—is not prescribed by law. 
Instead, organizational details are determined by statutes (Sa t zung) 
decided by the academic senate. Each university has a governing board 
(Universitätsrat) of between five and nine members , half elected by the 
academic senate, and the other half appointed by the Minister. Rectors are 
elected by the boards and thus more independent of all collegial academic 
bodies, but more dependent on the boards. The new universit ies become 
the employers of all academic and non-academic staff. Academics are no 
longer civil servants, but employed by private contracts. 
This new organizational law is probably the most far-reaching re form 
since 1849, when Austria embraced the Humboldt ian model . Austrian 
universit ies will acquire a kind of corporate autonomy unparalleled in 
the last 400 years. The new act makes Austria a leader in the "manageria l 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXIV, No. 3, 2004 
66 Hans Pechar 
revolut ion" on the European continent. Mos t policy makers regard this as 
a success. Mos t academics have mixed feel ings about the imposit ion of 
the corporate decis ion-making structures onto universities. 
The second re form cycle has a new policy on student expansion. 
Where the 1980s were shaped by a sceptical, somet imes even disapproving 
attitude to expansion, policy makers of the 1990s again agreed the social 
and economic value of popular educat ional aspiration. Subtle "cool ing-
out" strategies gave way to a more posit ive and optimistic view of student 
expansion. The homogeneous character of Austrian higher educat ion was 
now seen as an obstacle to fur ther expansion. Private universit ies were 
legalized in 1999. The most important step in divers i fying the system 
was establ ishment of the Fachhochschul sector in 1993. The government 
sof tened its severe ex-ante control and adopted a more liberal approach to 
quality assurance. Higher educat ion became a "mixed good" which yields 
social and private benefits and hence should be funded by publ ic and 
private contributions. In 2001, the government introduced tuition fees for 
the first t ime in 30 years. 
The Fachhochschul sector was legally established in 1993 and 
started to enrol students the fo l lowing year. Its main mission is to provide 
vocationally-oriented courses which can be effect ively completed in three 
or four years (most Fachhochschul courses require a min imum length of 
study of four years). Since this new sector is built f r o m completely new 
institutions, its growth is necessarily much slower than the university 
sector. In 2002/03, the sector had about 17,000 students and had already 
produced 10,000 graduates. 
Compared to other O E C D countries, the establ ishment of a non-
university sector in the 1990s was rather late. This at least partly explains 
the peculiar role Fachhochschulen play within Austrian higher education. 
If Austr ia had established Fachhochschulen in the late 1960s or early 
1970s, this sector would have been funded and organized on similar lines 
to the universities, as state agencies with l ine-by-line budgets . But in 
the early 1990s the policy context had changed. Fachhochschulen were 
designed as an alternative to universit ies not only in their educat ional 
profile, but also in their management , administrat ion, and funding . 
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The Fachhochschul policy was a more radical departure f r o m Austr ian 
traditions than U O G 1993 (Pratt & Hackl , 1999). There were no legal 
ownership restrictions. All institutions were owned by "quasi-pr ivate" 
associations or corporat ions and governed by a professional management . 
Academic and non-academic staff were employed and appointed directly 
by the institution. Students were admitted in accordance with available 
study places. Curr iculum decisions were made by academics in cooperat ion 
with institutional management . The final responsibili ty for quality was 
in the hands of an external professional body, the Fachhochschulrat, 
which guaranteed minimal standards of quality. Fachhochschulen were 
expected to vary widely in terms of profile and quality of their education. 
Fachhochschulen received a lump sum f r o m the federal government based 
on student numbers and subsidiary funds f rom multiple public sources, 
including provinces, municipali t ies, and in some cases chambers . 
The establ ishment of the Fachhochschul sector is regarded as the most 
significant success story of the last decade in Austrian higher education. 
This sector has already built ah igh reputation amongst students, employers , 
and the general public, and has established a different culture of learning 
to that of the universities. Students are expected to take the normal 
workload, and the institution must accept a high degree of responsibil i ty 
for student needs. Early indications are that f ew students drop out 
(10-20%) and that most complete their courses in "standard t ime." 
Dur ing the 1970s and 1980s, courses and curricula in universit ies 
were controlled by Parl iament, and any modificat ions usually required 
legislation. Political authorities c la imed to define the "one best solut ion" 
for each level of education, but of course views on appropriate curricular 
measures di f fered according to contradicting expert opinions and 
political convictions. Policy makers and academics became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the slow pace of curricular reform. 
The second re form cycle liberalized the paternalistic tradition of 
quality control. Public opinion leaders, the general public, and policy 
makers no longer believed in the "one best solution." It seemed to make 
better sense to allow a certain amount of competi t ion between different 
curricular profiles. To protect students against unacceptably low quality 
offer ings, Austr ia adopted Anglo-Saxon practices of accreditation. 
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This liberal approach to quality control was first applied in the 
Fachhochschul sector, which empowered the Fachhochschulrat to 
accredit courses on a model strongly influenced by the example of the 
British polytechnics and the United K i n g d o m ' s Counci l fo r Nat ional 
Academic Awards (Pechar, 2002). A similar approach was regarded as 
imperat ive in 1999, when the new act established private universities. 
The main aim of the Austrian Accreditation Council (AAC) is to open the 
university sector to private suppliers. The Counci l scrutinizes min imum 
standards of applicants, such as number of permanent staff , research 
activities, admission procedures, range and variety of study courses, and 
financial liability. 
For public universities, the present situation is quite different . In 
1997, the tight ministerial ex-ante control of university studies was 
replaced by a new study law which granted significant autonomy to the 
universit ies and their study commiss ions , which establish and maintain 
study courses. Thus far this devolut ion of responsibil i ty for curricula has 
not been balanced by external scrutiny, accreditation, approval , or supra-
institutional evaluation. The Ministry has promised establ ishment of an 
"evaluat ion agency" for 2004. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the idea of f ree higher education as 
a public good was rarely contested. W h e n fiscal consolidation became 
the top priority, the growth rate of higher educat ion expendi ture fell , and 
the resultant decline in per-capita expendi ture stirred debate on possible 
additional revenues f rom private sources. 
Conservat ives have never been enthusiastic about f ree higher 
educat ion. The situation was quite different fo r the social democrats , who 
profoundly changed Austrian higher education during the early 1970s. 
Free higher education was regarded as the core of those reforms. But even 
in the social democrat ic camp, the fiscal crisis changed attitudes. During 
the 1990s, doubts arose whether this policy had met the big expectat ions 
of equality of educat ional opportunit ies. Had the social make-up of 
the Austr ian student body really changed since the 1960s? A survey 
(Guger, 1994) concluded that about 30% of students come f r o m famil ies 
of the highest 10% income brackets. Students f r o m disadvantaged were 
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still strongly under-represented. It is doubt fu l that expansion has brought 
any significant change. 
From the perspect ive of social just ice, f ree higher educat ion is much 
more ambiguous than most supporters acknowledge . It is mainly the 
better-off who benefi t f r o m the public expendi ture required to provide 
f ree higher educat ion. On the other hand, it remains true that fees can 
hamper access by low- income students. In order to prevent this, fees 
must be brought into line with the social condi t ion of s tudents and their 
ability to pay. 
In 2000, the newly elected conservat ive government decided to 
introduce tuition fees of 363 Euros per semester, beginning in the 2001/02 
academic year. The m o v e was controversial , especially since only 
two weeks previously the minister of education had promised in a T V 
interview that no fees would be introduced during the present legislative 
term. Critics pointed out that the fees provided no additional income 
to universities, since they were collected by the treasury as essentially 
a "student tax" to facili tate fiscal consolidation. Also, the government 
introduced "flat f ees" for all enrolled students, with no differentiat ion 
between ful l - t ime and part- t ime students.3 Students who combine study 
with work, and hence require a longer durat ion of studies, would pay 
more for their degree than ful l - t ime students. 
The most important question remained whether fees would funct ion 
as a social barrier for students f r o m low income famil ies . It is too early to 
answer this question, based on empirical evidence. The fees are relatively 
low, and there is an exemption for students who are eligible for student 
aid. Evidence f r o m the first three years suggest that fees caused no 
decline in the number of active students. Enrolment figures did declined 
by more than 20% (Table 1), but this can be explained as the exit of 
non-act ive paper students who under previous laissez faire condit ions 
stayed enrolled for various reasons (section 1.1). Est imates based on 
examinat ion statistics show that the number of active students4 remained 
stable (Pechar & Wroblewski , 2002; Federal Government , 2002, p. 150). 
In 2001/02, when fees were first charged, there was about an 8% decline 
in the number of first enrolments , but this was compensa ted for during the 
immediately fo l lowing years with higher than expected first enrolments . 
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CONCLUSION 
Although most Austrian academics emphasize the differences 
between the first and the second reform cycle, especially the contrast in 
their underlying policy paradigms, the two phases have much in common. 
Future historians of Austrian higher education might instead point out the 
common characteristics of reform policies since the 1960s, a period in 
sharp contrast to the former elite system. 
The common ground of the two reform cycles is the diminishing 
role of government as benevolent patron of universities (Kulturstaat) on 
the Humboldt ian model. The precondition of this pattern was a small, 
homogeneous system of universities held together by the common 
values of an educated eli te—including senior civil servants, who ensured 
circumstances favourable to elite institutions. The emergence of a 
knowledge-based economy changed the social foundations of universities 
fundamental ly and irrevocably. This tremendously boosted the prestige of 
research and teaching at universities, at the same time abolishing many 
privileges taken for granted during the elite period. Higher education 
became a need rather than a luxury, an absolute necessity in terms of 
social demand and economic competitiveness. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, it was easy to confuse the new 
economically driven reform policy with the old state benevolence. 
Governments increased funding and granted unprecedented attention 
and importance to universities. But a crucial difference soon emerged: 
governments no longer gave unconditional support to elite institutions as 
a matter of noblesse oblige. Public funding would henceforth be based 
on the expectation of social and economic returns. In this perspective 
the two reform cycles were two policies with a common goal—to make 
universities more responsive to social and economic demands. ^ 
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Notes 
'Such as BHS, the professional schools at the upper secondary level. 
2Austria belongs to the countries with the highest drop out rates (more than 
50%) and the longest duration of studies (7.5 years to the first degree) within the 
OECD (cf. OECD 2003). 
'Although Austria has no formal part-time status for students, at least half of 
all students combine study with work. 
4"Active students" were those who took at least one examination during a 
period of two years. 
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